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ABSTRACT 
We present detailed empirical evidence that around Greek elections, 
misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax 
evasion and with important economic implications: the cumulative 
cost of these effects in recent years has been over 8% of GDP and has 
therefore been a contributing factor to Greece’s debt crisis and any 
effect this has had on the global economy. We interpret this evidence 
as a type of misgovernance which arises from electoral cycles in two 
types of incumbent incentives: (i) to allocate effort or attention 
between governing vs. campaigning; and/or (ii) to adopt even very 
inefficient redistributive policies if they benefit special interests with 
a lead over when the costs are observed. While these incentives may 
manifest differently among countries, our analysis suggests that 
electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and 
harmful than previous literature suggests. 
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Electoral Misgovernance Cycles:  
Evidence from wildfires and tax evasion  
in Greece and elsewhere 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the seminal papers of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), a great deal of 
effort has been devoted to understanding the distortions elections can impose 
on an economy. Economists have focused on the theory and empirical evidence 
for electoral cycles in important macroeconomic policy instruments such as 
government spending and money supply, and in macroeconomic outcomes 
such as inflation and unemployment. At the same time a plethora of disparate 
evidence suggests pervasive effects of all kinds of elections (from district 
attorneys to presidents) on society at large including the probability that wars 
are initiated (Gaubatz 1991), the timing of executions (Kubik and Moran 2003), 
the administration of criminal justice (Dyke, 2007), police appointments (Levitt 
1997), environmental policy (Huang 2010), the degree of enforcement of labor 
regulations (Ronconi 2008) and shirking by elected officials (Kuklinski 1978). 
Our work builds on striking evidence that around Greek parliamentary 
elections wildfires and tax evasion increase dramatically. An immediate feel for 
the effect can be obtained from figures 1 and 2 though we later present rigorous 
econometric analysis that shows the effect is both statistically and 
economically very significant. Areas burnt by wildfires on elections years have 
been 2.5 times the area burnt on non-election years, and tax evasion increases 
by approximately 0.2% of annual GDP in the two months that contain the 
official Greek pre-election period (40 days)1. We find that the wildfire 
effects are more pronounced in prefectures with more electoral 
                                                 
1
 We are not the first to suggest that wildfires increase around elections - see among others Kailidis et 
al (2004), though to the best of our knowledge no-one has previously used even elementary statistical 
analysis to measure this effect. We hope that early versions of this paper have contributed to a broader 
appreciation of these regularities through the attention they have generated in both Greek and 
International media (e.g. Walker, 2010).  
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competition. Separately we find that tax evasion is associated with reduced 
audits by tax collectors and is pursued by individuals and businesses that can 
respond to looser monitoring by immediately underreporting actual sales.  
The nature of this electoral effect seems to be original in two key respects. 
First, it is the only electoral effect we know of that involves an increase around 
elections in something public opinion unambiguously considers ‘bad’. Second, 
the electoral effect itself is mostly unobservable to voters until after the 
election a fact we will discuss in greater depth in Section 2. By contrast, all the 
empirical evidence on cycles we are aware of involves increases around 
elections in something that is widely observed and would be considered ‘good’ 
by voters, at least if it could be maintained indefinitely (e.g. less unemployment 
is ‘good’ as long as it can  be maintained without large costs later).2  
We interpret the electoral cycles in wildfires and tax evasion as part of a 
broader pattern for an increase in certain types of misgovernance around 
elections, in particular surreptitious misgovernance via relaxed enforcement of 
selected laws.3 These cycles cannot be explained by signaling arguments as in 
Rogoff (1990) since neither the underlying policies nor the precise extent of tax 
evasion or wildfires are easily observable; hence it seems implausible an 
incumbent would try to signal competence using a policy that is poorly 
observed. Additionally, there do not seem to be any partisan effects in our data 
as assumed by Alesina (1987) and others, so partisan models also do not seem a 
promising approach to explaining electoral misgovernance cycles. 
Instead, we argue that misgovernance via relaxed law enforcement arises for 
two complementary reasons. First, the open-list nature of Greece’s political 
system encourages many government officials to neglect their duties around 
elections and spend most of their time campaigning, often in remote 
constituencies. The Greek civil service is heavily politicized and dependent on 
elected officials and their entourage for management of day-to-day tasks so 
many public services are likely to be performed poorly around elections. 
                                                 
2
 An example of a ‘good’ policy that cannot be maintained indefinitely, is pre-electoral spending which 
must eventually be paid for in the future (e.g. in models as in Rogoff, 1990). 
3
 We use the term “law enforcement” expansively, to include all actions of government institutions 
aimed at ensuring that state laws are respected, violators are punished and consequences of violations 
are minimized. Even if laws themselves remain relatively stable over time, the extent to which they are 
actually enforced depends on the decisions and effort of both elected and career executives and we 
suggest that this varies with the electoral cycle. 
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Second, there are a host of laws the relaxation of which results in large 
immediate redistributive benefits for special interest groups while the large 
majority of voters who bear the costs can only observe such relaxations with a 
lag. This is closely related to Galbraith’s (1954) suggestion that unobserved 
embezzlement is pro-cyclical and accentuates cyclicalities in well-being 
because the embezzlers become better off while the embezzled are unaware of 
the the embezzlement until the cycle reverses itself; Munger (2003) extends 
this concept to febezzlement, i.e. legal analogs of or ‘functional equivalents’ to 
embezzlement. These two effects interact so that in the period immediately 
preceding an election, governments have an incentive to shift their effort from 
governing to campaigning and will do so selectively, abandoning effort 
primarily in areas where this will be rewarded by special interest groups in 
time for the election while it will only be observed after elections by the broad 
voting body. 
The difficulty in observing and quantifying policies related to the degree to 
which each law is enforced is not only a reason why it is difficult to interpret 
them within signaling models but also the reason that such policies have been 
difficult to detect, especially by researchers who usually have access to only 
fairly limited relevant data. Indeed, our research would not have been possible 
without some a priori knowledge (in part based on the experience of one author 
as Minister of the Economy) of what type of law enforcement manipulations 
may have occurred systematically over several decades; equally, it would also 
not have been possible without collecting detailed and unusual data in which 
such manipulations could be made apparent. While the opportunity for a clear 
observation of this type of misgovernance may be rare, it is likely that 
misgovernance itself is not, since governments seeking reelection will have 
similar manipulation incentives in all countries and all aspects of policy where 
manipulation is possible.  
Using Greece as a case study, we suggest that effort constraints and the 
interaction of information asymmetries and special interests can be relevant 
around elections internationally. To the extent that the underlying causes of 
electoral cycles are similar regardless of the details of the cycle, our research 
suggests that even thoroughly researched cycles in macroeconomic variables, 
such as inflation and unemployment, may be affected by government 
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inattention and special interest group pressures. This is consistent with results 
reported by Kaufmann (2010) according to which there is a strong relation 
between corruption and deficits as well as widespread evidence that electoral 
spending involves very specifically targeted transfers (e.g. Bickers and Stein 
1996). It is also consistent with results by Chang (2004) according to which 
open-list representation can result in increased incentives for political 
corruption, which of course is intimately associated with misgovernance. 
Additionally, we investigate whether similar tax evasion and wildfire election 
effects are present internationally and document some (weak in comparison to 
Greece) evidence that such effects may be relevant in certain other countries as 
well. However, the very nature of the manipulation we demonstrate is likely to 
be difficult to detect; so we believe we are able to report only the tip of an 
iceberg of unknown but potentially very significant size. Indeed, it is quite 
possible that the manipulation of law enforcement may have economic 
implications that dwarf the effects from monetary and fiscal policy in some 
countries, especially those with weak institutions. This hypothesis is supported 
by evidence we present based on international data that there is a relation 
between the extent of corruption and the magnitude of tax evasion and wildfire 
effects in that country. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the 
institutional and theoretical framework in which our empirical analysis is 
grounded. We develop a simple but explicit model of government incentives 
that we believe are relevant given the institutional setting and show that it 
delivers cycles similar to those observed. In Section 3 we present our empirical 
analysis of tax evasion and wildfires around elections. In Section 4 we discuss 
the broader implications of our work and conclude the paper in Section 5. 
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2. Framework 
2.1.  Institutional Background 
Tax evasion in Greece 
It is well-known that Greece has a large unrecorded economy that exists side-
by-side with the official activity and indeed in 2006 part of it was added to 
official estimates, increasing official GDP by 9.6%. Plainly, tax evasion is 
widespread and occurs in both direct and indirect taxation.  
There are several opaque mechanisms through which a government can 
manipulate incentives for particular interest groups to evade taxes without 
being noticed by the public-at-large. The most obvious mechanism is the 
intensity with which it audits particular types of businesses. One type of 
targeted audits the intensity of which can be changed very easily without being 
noticed, is the frequency of on-the-spot audits of sales and services reporting 
which determine monthly VAT revenues. 4 Similarly, the intensity of 
retroactive auditing of tax statements, of fines for evasion and the speed of 
collection are all to some extent under the control of elected party officials.  
The observed delays in collection can cause substantial fiscal losses even when 
appropriately discounted (see Christodoulakis 1994).  
The number and targeting of audits is controlled under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Finance and is under the direct day-to-day control of government 
officials (rather than a permanent non-partisan  civil service bureaucracy). In 
any case, high rank bureaucrats in tax authorities have intimate party 
affiliations and have even been candidates for various elected government posts 
in the same constituencies as the ones where they were responsible for 
collection (see also footnote 2). The fact that there is considerable discretion 
and variation in the intensity of audits is reflected in the fact that in periods of 
recession and adverse shocks in local demand, shop-owners and firms have 
often protested in favor of looser procedures for tax collection which would 
effectively create the potential for additional evasion.  
                                                 
4
 The current Minister of Finance has openly acknowledged that “The first thing a government does in 
an election year is to pull the tax collectors off the streets”. See Michael Lewis, ‘Beware of Greeks 
Bearing Bonds’, Vanity Fair, October 1 2010. 
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This institutional environment has two features that are key to the analysis that 
will follow.  First, the incumbent’s party machinery can control the ease with 
which targeted special interest groups can evade taxes. Furthermore, this will 
be noticed by the special interest groups immediately (word will get around 
that there will be less audits in number and strictness from party affiliates or 
discussions among other members of the special interest group). However, the 
rest of the population will only be able to infer such decisions with a delay (and 
imperfectly) when tax revenues are published. Special interest group targeting 
can be on any level of granularity, e.g. hotels in a particular electoral district or 
the self-employed throughout the country. 
Second, even where there is no intentional manipulation by high ranking 
government officials, they are not actively overseeing the process of tax 
collection the effectiveness of auditing is likely to diminish and since this will 
be observed by interested parties it will also lead to a concomitant increase in 
tax evasion. 
Wildfires and building rights in Greece 
Greece is particularly prone to destructive wildfires during its simultaneously 
dry, hot and often very windy summers. As is evident from figure 2, burnt areas 
have increased steadily in the period 1955-2008, presumably because of 
changing patterns of land use, climate and population. The extensive 2007 
wildfires in the summer of an election year received global news coverage as 
they involved 84 deaths, 270,000 hectares of forest burnt (of a total 3.5 million 
of forest area in a country with 13.2 million hectares surface area), several 
villages burnt with more than 2000 houses destroyed and direct economic 
damages exceeding 5 billon Euros.5 Arson is known to contribute a significant 
fraction of wildfires each year, though a lack of thorough forensic 
investigations has meant the causes of wildfires remain poorly understood.6 
Journalistic explanations for unusual wildfires include arson by property 
developers and government incompetence at preventing and fighting fires. In 
some cases government officials have gone so far as to attribute forest fires to 
                                                 
5
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Greek_forest_fires and http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/forests-
grasslands-drylands/country-profile-73.html. Note that our results are robust to the exclusion of the 
2007 wildfires and we report regression results for two separate subsamples. 
6
 According to the UN Economic Commission for Europe Forest Fire Statistics Timber Bulletin, Vol 
LV (2002), no.4, Table 8, in 2001 just 23% of area burnt in Greece had a known cause. Comparing to 
some countries with similar risk factors, the respective figure for Spain was 50% and for Turkey 76%.  
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opposition parties, foreign agents and more broadly forces aiming to destabilize 
the nation or the incumbent party’s authority. 
At the same time, Greece is a country that lacks a detailed land registry so there 
is considerable fuzziness on issues that in most advanced economies are 
extremely well-defined such as who is the owner of a particular property, what 
its borders are and what land uses are permitted.7 A property that is designated 
forest area has very little value as it can be used only for extremely limited 
purposes while forests often surround extremely valuable residential properties. 
It is very rare for official policy to bring forest areas into other uses unless they 
have been previously burnt by wildfires. Nevertheless, in a country with a 
population of 11 million, 400,000 homes have been recently built in areas that 
were previously forest areas while in certain suburbs of Athens up to 50% of 
large forest areas have surreptitiously had their designation changed to allow 
construction.8 
The fuzziness mentioned above means that many or even most land owners 
have to present a host of documents, assessments, permits, and go through 
complex legal procedures and court trials before they can build on their land. 
One necessary condition of course is that the land itself is not forested at the 
time the building permit is requested as then the permit will surely not be 
granted. This means that the incentives for arson increase whenever the 
probability of a burnt area obtaining a building permit goes up just as the 
incentives for tax evasion go up when the probability of being caught go down.  
As with tax collection, government officials inevitably influence the probability 
with which a building permit will be granted on burnt land, especially by 
affecting the strictness of the permit procedure, the speed and effectiveness of 
any reforestation projects after a forest is burnt as well as the response to any 
violations of land use laws. If these probabilities are manipulated intentionally, 
beneficiaries can be targeted quite narrowly and will immediately realize the 
benefits while those who incur the cost (less forest and more houses) only 
observe the change in government policy with a lag when relevant statistics are 
                                                 
7
 There is considerable political pressure from land owners to delay such registries as for many of them 
it would reveal that their property was locked in a legal status in which it has little value. 
8
 According to the president of the Panhellenic union of researchers and geo-technicians as quoted by 
Kathimerini newspaper, 26 September 2010, p.4. 
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published. Note that while wildfires have in recent years received significant 
media attention, aggregate statistics from which ‘unusual’ wildfires and 
government policy can be inferred are only published with a significant lag of 
several months. If authorities increase the probability for particular groups of 
land owners to obtain building permits in burnt forest areas then these groups 
will be more likely to burn the forests in which their land is situated.  
On the other hand, the probability of granting building permits on burnt forests 
may also increase because governments are doing a poor job of overseeing the 
integrity of the permission-granting process. Indeed, wildfire prevention and 
firefighting efficiency may decline for the same reason. 
Electoral campaigning versus governing  
It is obvious to any casual observer that as elections approach, government 
officials seeking re-election usually shift at least some of their time and 
attention from their ordinary duties to their private re-election strategies. In the 
US this can manifest itself for example in reduced attendance rates of members 
of Congress around the time they are up for re-election. In Greece it can mean 
that a minister is less likely to be found in his office overseeing the efficient 
functioning of tax collection, or of a firefighting effort.  
The reason is that in Greece, members of parliament are elected in open-list 
parliamentary elections which means their status within and outside their party 
as well as their chances of ministerial posts are influenced by the number of 
personal votes they receive. In practice this means that all government officials 
seeking election will be forced to leave some of their duties unattended as they 
travel to their constituencies and ramp up their campaigning before elections.9   
 
2.2. A formalization of relevant incumbent incentives 
In this subsection we build on our discussion of the institutional background to 
present a formalization of incumbent incentives that we believe cause the 
empirical observations we study in detail in Section 3. Specifically we are 
interested in why wildfires and tax evasion may peak around elections. We do 
                                                 
9
 A relevant case in point: when the devastating 2007 wildfires broke out, coordinating the fire-fighting 
effort was delayed by the absence of a key Minister who was campaigning at his constituency. 
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not attempt to embed our model of incumbent incentives in a framework of 
political competition as this raises issues quite separate from the ones we aim to 
focus on.10  
We assume that each government term lasts for T discrete time periods and that 
the incumbent acts in order to maximize an intertemporal  objective function by 
allocating available resources during each period {1,2,...,T} between effort tf  
to improve the quality of governance and effort tc  to campaign  for re-election. 
The latter can be interpreted in terms of its opportunity cost if the same effort 
were spent on providing improved governance instead, so the resource 
constraint is: 
1t tc f+ =
      (1) 
We define tq  as a scalar measure of some aspect of the quality of the country’s 
governance (for example the effectiveness of tax collection or the degree of 
forest protection) at time t, and assume it evolves over time according to:  
1t t tq q fδ γ−= +
     (2) 
with some initial condition 0q  inherited from the previous incumbent. For δ < 
1, this implies that quality of governance ‘depreciates’ over time at a rate (1-δ) 
and can be increased by γ per unit of effort 1tf ≤ . If all of the incumbent’s 
effort is devoted to improving the country, i.e. 1tf = , quality eventually reaches 
a bliss-level / (1 )q γ δ∞ = − . 
In each period 0 t T< ≤ the incumbent is concerned with the period’s objective 
Vt that impacts end-of-term voting: 
t t tV P S= +
      (3) 
The first term tP  represents a function of popularity that is positively affected 
by both campaigning and the quality of governance enjoyed by voters 
according to the simple form: 
1( )t t tP u c qα −= + ⋅
     (4) 
                                                 
10
 We merely note in passing that our model might be viewed as the reduced form of incumbent 
incentives that arise in a fully articulated model of electoral competition. For example, Grossman and 
Helpman (1996) develop a model of electoral competition in which incumbents maximize a weighed 
sum of the aggregate welfares of voters and special interests which is very similar to the objective 
function we develop below. 
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where 0α > . The assumption that votes are influenced by campaigning is 
motivated by the obvious fact that it is so widespread, by empirical evidence 
that it is effective (see e.g. Benoit and Marsh, 2008) and by several theoretical 
justifications discussed e.g. in Meirowitz (2008). The campaign effect is 
captured by 
2( )
2t t t
u c c c
ψ
= −
, where ψ denotes a saturation factor and 0 1ψ< ≤  
ensures that the usual conditions ' 0 , '' 0u u> <  are satisfied.  
Notice also that the quality of governance enters with a lag.11 This is because 
voters can only observe the quality of government when relevant government 
statistics are published or its effects are felt which takes time. For example, tax 
revenues from which evasion can be (very imperfectly) inferred are only 
published with a few months lag and the strictness with which building permits 
are granted can only be inferred by the number and location of new buildings 
after they are built. 
The second term in (3) is a function which captures the incumbent’s desire to 
award benefits to a special interest group that thrives on the deterioration of 
(certain kinds of) governance, i.e. 
, 0t tS qσ σ= − ⋅ >
      (5) 
The idea that benefits to a special interest group enter incumbent’s objectives 
directly has been used extensively, for example in Coate and Morris (1995). 
Their interpretation is that the more benefits the group receives the greater is 
their reciprocation to politicians, in terms e.g. of more campaign funds or 
private (potentially illegal) benefits. An alternative interpretation along the 
lines of Dixit and Londregan (1996) is that the special interest group constitutes 
a swing voter constituency the voting of which is much more sensitive to 
income transfers than the rest of the citizenship and needs to be specifically 
targeted independently of other electoral considerations. They find that groups 
which are ideologically moderate and for which consumption matters a lot 
relative to ideology will be ‘swing-voters’ that both parties try to win over by 
making redistributive transfers that benefit them at the expense of other groups.  
The aforementioned characteristics of swing-voters match the characteristics of 
groups we expect would benefit from wildfires and tax evasion: potential 
                                                 
11
 The duration of this lag in calendar time is determined by the duration of an incumbency T. By 
adjusting T, the lag can be made shorter or longer as appropriate for any specific context. 
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arsonists-cum-property-developers are not likely to be highly ideological while 
it’s plausible they value their consumption highly relative to their preference 
for electoral outcomes; the same is true for groups that are willing and able to 
evade taxes.12 Other models such as that of Robinson and Torvik (2005) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) are consistent with the use of socially 
inefficient policies to benefit special interest groups suggesting it is plausible 
that under appropriate conditions governments may facilitate a significant and 
very harmful reduction in government quality if it benefits even small special 
interest groups.  
What is novel in our assumption is that the special interest group advances its 
interests  in inverse proportion to the quality of government. This is because the 
special interest group is able to extract resources from inefficiencies in 
governance, for example by evading taxes or manipulating the process through 
which building permits are granted.  The quality of government enters (5) at 
current value as we assume that, in contrast with the voters at large,  the special 
interest group observes the situation immediately because they are directly 
involved in its mismanagement, e.g. they are themselves evading taxes or 
exploiting laxity in the enforcement of property development laws.  
Over his term in office the incumbent allocates resources { }, , 1 ...t tc f t T=  in 
order to maximise an intertemporal objective function of the form: 
{ }1max T T tT t t TtW P S Lµ −== + +∑
   (6) 
                                                 
12
 We do not tackle the commitment problems that arise between voters and candidates that are 
engaged in the redistributive interaction. Part of this problem can be resolved by embedding Dixit and 
Londregan’s model in a dynamic game so that candidates can commit by putting their reputation at 
stake as in Aragonès, Palfrey and Postlewaite (2007). On the other hand, to the extent that voting is 
secret, voters cannot similarly commit to voting for an incumbent that has offered a benefit. Stokes 
(2005) addresses this problem by arguing that in fact voting is not as secret as is often presumed 
because in many countries party machinery is enmeshed in social networks which have ways of 
(imperfectly) inferring individuals’ votes. As Stokes notes, it is ‘hard for voters to dissemble before 
people they’ve known all their lives…. you know if a neighbor voted against your party if he can’t look 
you in the eye on election day’. In Greece, party machinery is indeed notoriously enmeshed in social 
networks so this mechanism may well be how commitment issues are resolved to support interactions 
associated with redistributive politics. As an empirical matter there is also endless anecdotal evidence 
that (for whatever reason) the commitment issue is not an obstacle to redistributive politics. For 
example, both main parties routinely charter planes so Greek students studying in the U.K. can fly 
home for free on election weekends with no guarantee that they will actually vote for the party bearing 
the cost of their flight. 
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where µ is the discount factor and TL  is a legacy function which captures its 
desire to leave the country in a good condition at time T. To keep things simple, 
we assume:  
, 0T TL qθ θ= ⋅ >
     (7) 
 This enters the government's objective separately to any effects through voting 
because it affects post-term ego-rents, employment prospects, reputation effects 
for the governing party and/or individuals, as well as the possibility that gross 
mismanagement may prompt prosecution of particular officials by subsequent 
governments. It can also be viewed as a proxy for fact that if re-elected the 
government will be in a better position in its subsequent term if the state of the 
country is better (we do not explore our model in an infinite horizon context). 
If µ < 1, this reflects diminished responsibility for conditions at the beginning 
of the term relative to the end and/or potentially imperfect memory. The 
assumption that voting depends on a retrospective measure of the quality of 
governance is also plausible as long as this is interpreted as a signal of 
prospective performance as in many models following Rogoff (1990). 13   
Our formulation can be interpreted as one where there is a trade-off between 
effort spent in producing and communicating a positive signal to voters.14 A 
similar interpretation applies to discounting the special interest group. This 
leads to incentives for disguised redistributive benefits, as in Tullock (1983) 
and Coase and Morris (1995). In our context, this happens because of the 
redistributional and asymmetric information characteristics of the effects of 
misgovernance. As explained above, certain types of misgovernance are 
observed more quickly by those who benefit than by those who incur a cost. In 
the period immediately preceding an election this has a severe effect on 
government incentives since all benefits are observed before the election while 
costs are observed afterwards. 
                                                 
13
 Note that recent evidence suggests that voters care about contemporaneous or past utility in re-
electing incumbents even when this is affected by shocks that are clearly uncorrelated with their future 
utility (see for example Achen and Bartels, 2004). 
14
 We interpret the discount factor µ<1 as a way of modeling the fact that campaigning as well as 
governance quality signals are more likely to be effective close to an election. As an empirical fact it is 
obvious that both campaigning and conditions just before an election carry more weight than conditions 
earlier on. The reasons for this are again tangential to our analysis but can easily be understood as 
rational consequences of the fact that closer to elections campaigning can be more carefully targeted to 
the issues and constituencies that happen to be important at that time and that conditions are less 
dependent on the actions of a predecessor at the end of an incumbency relative to its beginning. 
  13 
Interpreted in terms of the institutional environment we aim to model, suppose 
that before elections an incumbent shifts attention away from providing quality 
governance in particular by reducing audits to certain taxpayers, by providing 
building rights more easily and/or by being slower to implement reforestation 
projects. These effects will not be immediately felt by voters at large, until they 
show up after the elections as less larger deficits and more houses; on the other 
hand, they will be immediately appreciated before the election by the groups 
that act to exploit the temporary drop in audits or increase in building 
opportunities. In this way an incumbent can create the illusion of an overall 
welfare improvement before elections. Voters cannot learn their way out of this 
situation over repeated elections as long as they continue to observe the quality 
of government with a lag (the underlying cause is an asymmetric information 
effect, not an irrationality). 
 
2.3. Optimal misgovernance paths 
Substituting (4), (5) and (7) into (6) we obtain the problem 
2
11
max ( ) ( )
2
T T t
T t t t Tt
W c c q qψµ α µσ θ σ−
−
=
 
= − + − ⋅ + − ⋅ 
 
∑
  (8) 
Assuming that the country is not overwhelmed by the special interest group, so 
that min[ , / ]σ θ α µ< , and optimizing the Hamiltonian that corresponds to (8) 
and (2) with respect to optimal campaigning effort at each t we get: 
( )* 0 1 ttc µδ= Γ + Γ ⋅
      (9) 
[ ] [ ] ( )0 11 ( ) (1 )1 ,1 1
Tγ α µσ γ α δ σ δθ
ψ µ δ ψ µ δ µ
− + −Γ = − Γ = ⋅ − ⋅
+ − + −
 
 
From this we can derive the quality of governance in each period which for δ>0 
is: 
( )0 1 2t ttq A A Aµ δδ= − ⋅ − ⋅
                   (10) 
0 0 1 1 2 0 1 02(1 ) , ,1A A A A A q
γ γµ
δ µ δ= − Γ = ⋅ Γ = − −− −
 
 
For µ > δ, governance quality over [0, T] is maximized at: 
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         (11) 
From this it is obvious that for appropriate initial condition15 0q and parameter 
values we can get 0 *t T< < , that implies a cyclical behavior in the quality of 
governance according to the following pattern: After elections, campaigning 
declines and this allows more effort to be invested in improving – albeit for a 
while – the quality of governance, but as the new polls are approaching the 
incumbent increases campaigning effort while the quality of governance 
deteriorates reaching a low on the election day.  
Misgovernance behavior is depicted for plausible parameter values in Figure 3 
and is classified as a function of the importance of legacy θ, the strength of 
special interests σ and the campaigning factor ψ in the table below (under the 
additional restrictions that µ>δ, min[ , / ]σ θ α µ< ).  
Incumbent Accountability factor Quality of Governance 
Benevolent [ (1 ) ] / (1 )θ α δ σ µ δ> + − + −
 
Peaks on elections 
Opportunistic (1 ) / [ (1 ) ] / (1 )σ ψ γ θ α δ σ µ δ+ − < < + − + −
 
Troughs on 
elections 
Embezzling (1 ) /θ σ ψ γ< + −
 
Troughs with 
destruction 
 
A government is ‘benevolent’ if it values the quality of governance it bequeaths 
very highly (large θ) and is not affected by special interests (low σ) leading 
quality of governance to peak on the eve of elections. Notice that a lower 
impact of campaigning on voting ψ only affects the overall level of the quality 
of government but not its pattern over time. 
If legacy is less important (θ small), then Γ1 > 0 which means campaign effort 
reaches a maximum at: 
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 Solving the condition 0 *t T< < for 0q  requires that the quality of governance inherited from the 
previous incumbent is neither too high nor too low. If it is too high, the opportunistic incumbent 
steadily erodes the public good for the benefit of campaigning without worrying that a critical 
deterioration will occur. In contrast, if governance is discovered after the elections to be very bad, even 
an opportunistic government will devote most of its resources to improve the situation. 
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                                                    (12) 
Such a government is opportunistic if it stops short of expropriating quality of 
governance to use it for campaigning (i.e. it at least respects max 1c ≤ ), which 
requires that  (1 ) /θ σ ψ γ> + − . If it has even less of an interest in its legacy, or 
special interests are excessively strong, the incumbent is ‘embezzling’ part of 
the public good q by making 0Tf < and uses the resources to campaign more 
intensely ( 1Tc > ). Between the benevolent and opportunistic parametrization 
there is a condition in which a ‘non-opportunistic’ government will not cause 
cycles since there Γ1 = 0 and campaigning is constant over time. Between the 
benevolent and opportunistic parametrization there is a narrow condition in 
which there is no cycle at all. 
 A higher effectiveness of campaigning (small ψ) always lowers the quality of 
governance though cycles can even arise for very large ψ if special interests are 
strong enough (large σ). Cycles can arise if campaigning is powerful enough 
relative to the importance of legacy θ even in the limiting case where special 
interests do not exist (σ=0). Similarly, the effect of special interests can be 
isolated in the limiting case where δ = 0, in which case campaigning is constant 
at ct=[1+γ(σ-α/µ)]/ψ until the very last period at which it shifts to cΤ =[1+γ(σ-
θ)]/ψ.  When legacy concerns are not very important (θ small) this implies a 
drop in the quality of governance in the last period, the duration of which is 
determined by the duration of the information lag that voters have relative to 
special interests.   
Evidently, since the effects of special interests and campaigning interact and 
can be similar, it would be very difficult to identify the relative importance of 
each effect from an observed misgovernance path. In our empirical analysis we 
will use other considerations in order to try to ascertain the relative importance 
of special interests and campaigning incentives as drivers of electoral 
misgovernance (section 3.6). 
While we do not model voters’ objective functions, the cycles are not an 
artifact of some voter irrationality. As long as voters are influenced by 
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campaigning and/or become informed about the quality of government more 
slowly than the powerful special interests these effects are likely to arise. 
 
2.4. Previous explanations of electoral cycles 
Misgovernance as signaling?  
Starting with Rogoff (1990), much recent literature on political business cycles 
has emphasized the role of cycles in macro policy variables as an information 
signal of the incumbent’s ability when an electorate can observe this less 
accurately than the incumbent. While our evidence of misgovernance can be 
interpreted in the context of this type of model, we do not think this is 
appropriate because the mechanism driving the model seems implausible when 
applied to tax evasion and wildfires. 
Indeed, it seems implausible that among all the signals available to a 
government (including official monetary and fiscal policy) the incumbent 
would choose to signal its ability through a form of misgovernance that can 
only be observed in obscure data which is not easily accessible and is published 
well after elections take place (as is the case for the data we used in our 
empirical analysis). But most importantly there is no doubt that – contrary to 
what the logic of signaling is about - if a government openly announced it will 
allow forests to burn and selected businesses to cheat on taxes, the election 
result would be catastrophic. Interpreted as signals, easier granting of building 
permits and the laxity of tax auditing are mostly private. 
Partisan misgovernance? 
Another popular explanation of electoral cycles in macro data is that they arise 
as a consequence of partisan effects on policy (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina, 1987). 
However, we do not empirically observe any partisan effects on wildfires or tax 
evasion (see Section 3.2) so again this does not seem a good direction to 
explore for an explanation. 
Opportunistic political business cycles 
While the mathematics of the voting component of our government’s 
incentives is in  some ways similar to that of Nordhaus (1975) the standard 
widespread criticisms of this work do not apply here because of significant 
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differences in interpretation. In Nordhaus’ model voters are repeatedly fooled 
by a temporary pre-election period of good economic conditions without 
realizing this will only lead to worse conditions after the election; in our model 
it is only campaigning that repeatedly influences voters, but it is much easier to 
accept that high levels of campaigning before elections will repeatedly 
influence voters over iterations of the election cycle. Furthermore, our model 
does not rest on naive voter expectations: instead we interpret the retrospective 
voting we use as a proxy for prospective voter behavior in an environment 
where the quality of governance before an election is a signal that is positively 
correlated with the expected quality of governance after an election. Indeed, 
our argument is that a government may be willing to sacrifice good policies 
that provide positive signals about ability in order to pursue campaigning just 
before elections which has no social benefit and serves only to influence the 
outcome of elections. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Effect of elections on tax evasion 
While there is evidence that elections cause a reduction in tax revenues in many 
countries, as far as we know, there has been no suggestion that at least some 
part of this may be due to an increase in tax evasion rather than official fiscal 
ease.16 Perhaps relatedly, there is no obvious way of measuring changes in the 
degree of tax evasion from conventional annual revenue data since tax codes 
change from year to year as does the distribution of economic activity across 
sectors which causes variation in aggregate metrics like the revenue-to-GDP 
ratio. 
On reflection however, a brief sharp spike in tax evasion around elections 
should be unmistakable from high frequency revenue data: it should lead to a 
temporary drop in revenues which cannot be due to changes in the tax code 
since the tax code does not change over brief intervals of a few months. Tax 
evasion should also be apparent in how any brief sharp drop is distributed 
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 This may be especially important considering that the strongest electoral manipulations of fiscal 
policies have been observed in developing countries where tax evasion is likely to be rampant; see for 
example Brender and Drazen (2005). 
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across categories of tax revenues as well as in the behavior of government tax 
audits around elections. The key to observing electoral tax evasion is therefore 
appropriate tax revenue data.  
Data 
Our monthly tax revenue and Greek GDP data were transcribed from various 
editions of the Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of Greece and span the period 
1972:1-2009:12 during which there were 13 elections. We also transcribed 
monthly revenue data broken down into subcategories from documents made 
available by the Ministry of the Economy’s General Accounting Office at 
www.mof-glk.gr/ekdoseis/py.htm. The data is available since 2001 but the 
categories were changing and not sufficiently fine-grained to have 
subcategories of specifically tax revenues until 2008 so we can only use data 
for 2008 and 2009 from this source. We also transcribed data from documents 
obtained from the Ministry of the Economy’s Office for Special Audits for the 
number of audits during the period July 2005 - August 2009. 
We searched for similar data for other countries but found only scarce data 
available in the standard sources. We found ad hoc monthly tax revenue data 
for 13 additional countries for various subsamples across each country after 
2001 in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database though we had to 
complement the online edition with the monthly CD-Rom editions since 2001 
as the two sources had certain differences in coverage. Where there was a 
conflict in numbers we used the online version which is continuously updated 
to reflect more accurate measurements as they become available. Additionally 
where GDP figures were not available in the IFS database we complemented it 
from WDI Online. 
Finally, we compiled an international monthly election date database using 
online data from the Political Database of the Americas, the African Elections 
Database and Wikipedia entries for elections in countries not covered by any 
other database. 
In order to classify each country as a presidential or parliamentary democracy 
so as to  decide which of several types of elections to focus on in each country, 
we used Persson & Tabellini’s (2003) dataset but cross-checked it and 
complemented it with several online sources since it did not cover all countries. 
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The additional sources were the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
the Interparliamentary Union and again the Political Database of the Americas 
and the African Elections Database. Where there were conflicts we resolved 
them by studying each case in detail (for example in the Persson & Tabellini 
database, Greece is misclassified as a presidential democracy). 
Empirical results 
We have already seen a visual demonstration in figure 1 that tax revenues drop 
during the typical pre-election period which spans 40 days and therefore the 
month of the election as well as the previous month.17 Tax revenues in pre-
election periods are never larger than all the collections in the four years 
surrounding each election year (for the same two-month period). In all 
elections held between 1974 and 2009, average bimonthly revenues expressed 
as percent of GDP were lower than the average of the respective figures in the 
two adjacent years. 
Figures 4 and 5 show that this effect is localized primarily on these months and 
that there is no discernible reduction in tax revenues throughout the entire year 
(which was confirmed in unreported regressions with annual data where 
election dummies were insignificant). This is due to the fact that more 
aggregated data adds noise which masks the regularity that is clearly apparent 
in the monthly data (and not because any drop is reversed immediately after 
elections). This is similar to the effect reported by Akhmedov and Zhravskaya 
(2004) who find that monthly government spending data can lead to very 
different conclusions than lower frequency data. 
This visual analysis is confirmed in the standard election dummy OLS 
regressions (e.g. as in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997) reported in Table 1. 
There we find that during the election period there is a significant drop which is 
not compensated for by a post-election increase. We also find that there is no 
partisan effect and the results we report are stable over time.  
In Table 2 we show that the drop in tax revenues in the latest 2009 elections 
was focused in subcategories where tax evasion can easily respond to brief 
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 The minimum permissible time between the announcement of elections and the election date is three 
weeks in Greece but surprise elections of this type are extremely rare. 
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periods of less auditing because it simply involves evading taxes by 
underreporting sales (by contrast, evasion of direct taxes, e.g. on civil servants’ 
wages taxed at source are unlikely to be affected by elections). In figure 6 we 
present direct evidence that the number of tax audits in the months just before 
elections does indeed drop drastically. 
 
3.2. Effect of elections on wildfires 
Data 
We have obtained annual data collected by the Forest Agency of the Ministry 
of Agriculture of Greece for the period 1955-2007 for annual forest areas burnt 
by wildfires. According to experts there do not seem to be any significant 
changes in the way this data was collected or recorded during our sample, 
except for a minor definitional change in 1991 which requires that burnt areas 
of size less than one acre are included in all records starting that year. We have 
updated this data with data made available by the Greek fire service at 
http://www.fireservice.gr/statistika/dasika.php through to the end of 2009.18 
The fire service also provides wildfire data decomposed by prefecture for 2000-
2009 and we use this panel in some of the regressions that follow. We also 
obtained data on electoral outcomes broken down by prefecture from the 
Ministry of the Interior (http://ekloges.ypes.gr/). 
We also compiled international data for 45 additional countries for various 
subsamples during 1980-2007 by merging online data from Eurostat, with data 
transcribed from a United Nations publication for forest fires (Timber Bulletin 
Volume ILV (2002) No4) and an EU report (‘Forest Fires in Europe’, 2005, 
report # 5). In addition, for the case of Italy which was of particular interest due 
to the close correlation of fires with Greece, we obtained additional data for the 
period 1970-1979 from the UN Economic Commission for Europe, ‘Forest 
Fires Statistics’, vol XXXVI supplement 7, February 1984 and for 2008-2009 
from occasional publications of the EU-JRC on ‘Forest Fires in Europe’. 
                                                 
18
 Data for 2010 is available on a provisional basis only so we have not included it though it is clear 
that fires were much lower in 2010 (which was not an election year) than in any recent election years. 
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Finally, we use monthly temperature and precipitation data for 1955-2008 
which we obtained by request from the Measurement Unit of Climatic Changes 
of the National Observatory of Athens as collected at four separate weather 
observatories stationed across Greece (Corfu, Methana, Larissa and 
Herakleion). In explaining international differences in observed electoral 
effects we used Transparency International’s 2009 corruption perception index. 
Empirical results 
In our 55 year sample there were 18 elections (two were in 1989, so election 
years are 17). The total area burnt during 17 election years amounts to 949,900 
hectares significantly exceeding the area burnt in the 38 non-election ones.  The 
average area burnt on election years is almost two and half times larger than the 
annual average on years without elections while the standard deviation of the 
area burnt during election years is three times higher than that of non-election 
years. In figure 2 it is particularly striking that during the military dictatorship 
years of 1967-1974 when there were no elections, wildfires were also 
particularly low.19 Note also that in the period 1989-1990 there were actually 
three elections which may explain the relatively low effect of each election 
separately in those years.20  
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 We repeated the analysis with a dummy variable for that period but found the dummy was 
insignificant suggesting a relative paucity of fires during the dictatorship may be purely due to the lack 
of an election in this period. There is no evidence that the data was manipulated in this period and, to 
the best of our knowledge, experts have not questioned the accuracy of figures collected during the 
dictatorship. 
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 Three major wildfires were also observed in 1965, 1988 and 1998 during which no election took 
place. However, all three cases coincide with events that led to relaxations in law enforcement similar 
and probably more severe than those produced by electoral misgovernance. In 1965, there was a major 
political upheaval throughout Greece caused by the ousting of the elected Prime Minister and repeated 
attempts to impose a Government of defectors. The country was paralyzed from massive political 
rallies, while the functioning of the state was critically affected by the extreme frequency of changes in 
the executive. For example, the post of the forest-relevant Agricultural minister was filled with four 
nominations between July and September of that year. In October 1987, the Government passed Law 
1734 according to which areas used for livestock grazing (“voskotopia”) could be eligible for obtaining 
construction permits. This created incentives for diminishing the forest density of land and, according 
to Kailidis et al (2004), explains the intensity of wildfires that took place the following summer of 
1988. In a separate analysis of fires due solely to agrarian activities, Dimitrakopoulos and Mitsopoulos 
(2006) show that they peaked in 1988 leaving 26,009 hectares of forest burnt, more than three times the 
average area of 8,600 hectares burnt for similar reasons over the period 1980-97. Wildfires in 1998 are 
perhaps the clearest case of the effects of a low quality of governance unrelated to elections: in an 
attempt to re-organize the wildfire management agency, the Government put fire-fighting responsibility 
with the Fire Brigades Commission, replacing a previous decentralized structure headed by the forest 
guard (for an account see Xanthopoulos, 2006). Lack of cooperation between the various groups 
resulted in a new peak of forest fires, and the new agency established credibility only after a substantial 
reduction in wildfires in subsequent years. 
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We follow up on our visual demonstration of an electoral effect in wildfires of 
figure 2 with the standard election dummy regression results of Table 3. The 
regression results suggest a very significant election effect, which remains 
stable over time and strong when we control for climatic conditions. We 
control for annual variation in climatic conditions in two separate ways, using 
data on relevant weather conditions and using data for wildfires in Italy which 
are closely correlated with wildfires in Greece, presumably because of similar 
climate conditions. In order to construct our weather variables, we note that 
precipitation matters not just during the fire season but also in preceding 
months since this affects air and soil humidity and water reservoirs. Since the 
annual wildfire season ends in September we construct a precipitation index 
that measures the stock accumulated during the 12 months spanning from 
October of the year t-1 to September of year t. On the other hand, temperatures 
only matter around the time of the wildfires so to keep things simple we 
averaged temperatures at the four observation stations from which we have 
observations and use summer measurements (June, July and August average). 
We found a strong interaction (multiplicative) effect whereby high 
temperatures after periods of little precipitation dramatically increase the area 
burnt by wildfires. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt at a 
regression analysis of the effect of climate on Greek wildfires with the 
exception of some studies of relatively narrow phenomena (Kalampokidis et al, 
2007, find that meteorological and vegetation patterns help explain wildfire 
dynamics in an area in Northern Greece during 1985-95).21 
It is worth commenting on the fact that it does not seem to matter whether the 
election takes place before or after the summer (when the vast majority of 
wildfires occur). Note first that this is entirely consistent with the patterns 
generated by our model (see Figure 1). Whether the peaks in wildfires are 
happening because of misgovernance due to inattention or to the promotion of 
special interests, the quality of governance can be low both before and 
immediately after elections according to our model. The quality of governance 
related to forest protection and building permits may be slower to respond to 
government policy than the number of tax audits which can be easily and 
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 See among many others Flannigan and Harrington (1988), Swetnam (1993) and Larsen (1996) for 
evidence that weather conditions are related to wildfires. Our international data from other countries 
contained several other countries with wildfires highly correlated to Greece’s such as Serbia but their 
span was much shorter than our data for Italy.  
  23 
immediately adjusted up or down, which would explain why post-election 
adjustments are faster for tax evasion than for wildfires. Additionally, if the 
owner of a property that is a forest makes progress towards obtaining a building 
permit before elections that take place in February, he will nevertheless have to 
wait till the next summer to attempt to burn the forest that will by then have 
become a more pressing obstacle than it was in the previous summer. In other 
words, wildfires will happen in the summer after any misgovernance occurs 
which itself happens in a period of a few months before an election, meaning 
wildfires appear in the same year as an election regardless of the timing of the 
election relative to the summer. 
As with tax evasion, there is no partisan effect in wildfires which we attempt to 
detect by adding a dummy variable for when the centre/socialist party was in 
office.22 In 1989 the dummy takes the value 0.5 because the incumbent was 
socialist in only one of the two elections of that year and in 1990 it is also 0.5 
because both parties participated in an ecumenical government at the time of 
the election (other specifications deliver very similar conclusions). 
Using cross-sectional data across Greece’s 51 electoral prefectures, we find that 
competition tends to accentuate the electoral impact of wildfires (Table 5 and 
Figure 7). In particular, we find that where the outcome of the election tends to 
divide the seats of elected officials roughly equally between the two main 
parties, this leads to a larger election year effect on wildfires than where one 
party tends to dominate. This is in line with evidence in many other contexts 
that the degree of political competition matters for policy. For example, 
competition can lead to slower adjustment of budget deficits (Poterba, 1994) 
and the redistribution of spending across districts (Bickers and Stein, 1996). 
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 Before the 1967 dictatorship the two main parties were the National Radical Union (conservatives) 
and the Centre Union (democrats). After the restoration of democracy in 1974, the conservative party 
was renamed and the centre party was largely absorbed by the newly-founded socialist party hence the 
common treatment. We also tried a number of alternative specifications that took into account whether 
the party leader was the incumbent Prime Minister at the time of the elections, the duration of each 
incumbency and other similar factors but were unable to detect any partisan effect. 
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3.3. Economic consequences of electoral cycles in misgovernance 
In Table 4 we report estimates of the economic cost of wildfires and tax 
evasion based on our benchmark regressions of Tables 1 and 3. Based on Table 
1, each election results in a decrease of tax revenue by 0.9% of monthly GDP 
for two months which means a reduction by 0.18% of annual GDP. For the 13 
elections that took place in the period 1974-2009, this amounts to 5.7 billion 
Euros at 2008 prices. 
Similar calculations lead to a rough estimate of the total area burnt because of 
an electoral effect during our sample. The additional area burnt on an election 
years relative to a normal year is significantly more than the normal year burnt 
area itself (i.e. election years have more than double area burnt). According to 
our analysis, over our entire sample, almost 6% of the surface of Greece has 
been burnt because of elections.  
Without accounting for how these effects corrode social morality and 
institutions and increase uncertainty and unfairness, and without accounting for 
loss of human life and environmental consequences we still arrive at a cost of 
more than 8% of GDP for the cost of these effects over the years of our sample. 
 
3.4. Effect of misgovernance on elections 
A number of studies show that economic conditions affect election outcomes 
(e.g. Fair, 1978) and that benefits granted to particular constituencies also 
affect their voting behavior (see e.g. Levitt and Snyder, 1997). Yet finding 
similar evidence for a relationship between misgovernance and election 
outcomes may seem excessively optimistic for a number of reasons. 
In our model of incumbent incentives there is no clear direction for the effect of 
electoral misgovernance on election outcomes: while voters punish 
misgovernance, they reward campaigning which can only be achieved at the 
expense of some degree of misgovernance.  Unobserved variables like 
campaigning effort as well as variation in broader political conditions which 
modify the trade-off between campaigning effort and misgovernance between 
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elections make it difficult to empirically infer any relationship between 
misgovernance and election outcomes. Furthermore, to the extent that 
misgovernance is primarily a redistributive transfer rather than a product of 
inattention, it may or may not affect election outcomes depending on the 
reasons underlying the transfer (e.g. indirect benefits from special interests to 
incumbents may or may not be used for electoral purposes). 
These observations suggest that if there exists a relationship between 
misgovernance and election outcomes then to observe it we must use an 
appropriate instrument which is highly correlated with misgovernance but 
uncorrelated with election outcomes so that potential endogeneity can be 
eliminated. We are fortunate enough to have an excellent instrument with these 
properties in the case of wildfires, namely weather data.23 A 2SLS regression of 
the percentage lead of the incumbent in elections from 1955 to 2008 on the log 
of area burnt using the three weather variables that appear in Table 3 as 
instruments give a coefficient of 0.6 which has a p-value of 0.048. Interpreted 
literally this suggests that a 1% increase in area burnt leads to a 0.6% increase 
in votes for the incumbent (e.g. 0.3% of voters switch from the second party to 
the incumbent because of the increase in wildfires). 
 
3.5. International evidence for effect of elections on wildfires and tax 
evasion 
Combining several data sources we were able to amass a limited data set with 
which to offer a preliminary investigation into the relationship between 
elections, tax evasion and wildfires in other countries (Tables 6 and 7).  
In sum, there is no effect of elections on wildfires and a very weak effect on tax 
evasion when pooling across all countries. However, there is some evidence 
that countries that are more corrupt tend to have more wildfires and more tax 
evasion on election years. Given the very short samples we have to work with 
in each country and the fact that institutional conditions may preclude these 
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 We could not find an appealing instrument in the case of tax evasion. Lags of changes in monthly tax 
revenue was the only instrument worth considering but has low correlation with current changes in 
revenue and may not be independent of anticipated election outcomes. Using it as an instrument we 
were unable to find a significant relationship between election outcomes and tax evasion. 
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specific manifestations of electoral misgovernance in many countries, we 
consider this evidence as highly suggestive of an international dimension to the 
misgovernance effect we describe. 
 
3.6. Distinguishing between inattention and redistributive politics 
We certainly do not wish to suggest that any explanation of the empirical 
evidence we have presented should be monocausal and indeed our model was 
developed to illustrate that both inattention and redistributive politics can be 
simultaneously relevant in a complementary way. However, we think it is also 
interesting to try to extract as much information as possible from the data 
regarding their relative importance. Interestingly, in the case of wildfires, the 
empirical evidence suggests a major role for the explanation based on 
redistributive politics for two reasons. 
First, since wildfire prevention and tax audits are managed at the level of the 
central government it is hard to explain how inattention at the central 
government level could be responsible for the regional pattern presented in 
figure 7 according to which the wildfire effect is stronger in regions where the 
parliamentary seats are more heavily contested. On the other hand if 
redistributive politics were relevant and swing voters were being targeted, we 
would expect to see stronger effects in prefectures with more competition, 
which is exactly what we see in figure 7. 
Second, the fact that there seems to be a strong positive effect of wildfires on 
re-election prospects (after correcting for any endogeneity) while at the same 
time public opinion is known to be very strongly in favour of forest protection 
suggests that this effect must be coming through the role of transfers to special 
interest groups. 
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4. Implications 
Having presented strong empirical evidence that an electoral cycle exists in 
Greek wildfires and tax evasion and explained it as the outcome of 
redistributive politics and incumbent inattention cycles, it is important to 
consider the broader implications of these findings. 
Once we accept our explanations for our empirical evidence of cycles in 
wildfires and tax evasion they immediately suggest the phenomenon of cycles 
is likely to appear in many other variables under the government’s control. The 
main obstacle to studying additional variables is the paucity of data for 
sufficiently long time series of variables associated with government output. 
However, it seems plausible we have only seen the tip of the iceberg and that 
the economic forces driving these cycles are likely to have far reaching 
consequences. In this sense the cost calculations of Section 3 are a lower bound 
for the cost to Greece of these effects. Indeed, electoral cycles have almost 
certainly contributed to the poor state of Greek public finances: According to 
Walker (2010) 27,000 people were added to the public payroll before the 
election, despite the dire outlook in 2009, thus further fuelling its ongoing 
financial crisis. It has also contributed to a widespread feeling of social 
injustice as it is widely appreciated that public sector misgovernance has made 
some individuals wealthy by diffusing costs across many others. 
It is worth noting that our explanations of electoral misgovernance cycles imply 
that their costs are entirely avoidable by better institutions which would e.g. 
allow incumbents to campaign without such a drastic impact on the quality of 
governance or limit parties’ ability to use extremely leaky bucket transfers to 
woo swing voters. That is, we are not observing a cycle of higher 
misgovernance around some optimal average but instead are seeing a surge of 
misgovernance around elections which could be eliminated altogether. 
This observation is also very important for how we interpret the implications of 
our analysis for other countries. The evidence presented in Section 3.5 that 
wildfires and tax evasion cycles may also exist in other countries is certainly 
not definitive and it is certainly possible to believe that even if these effects 
extend beyond Greece they do so in just a few countries. However, 
redistributive politics and inattention are likely to be important in many 
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countries without very strong public institutions – it is just that they may 
manifest their effects in different ways across countries. For example, 
redistributive politics can only be expected to induce wildfires in countries 
where property laws, land morphology and climate provide the appropriate 
incentives; tax evasion can only be the outcome of inattention in countries 
where elected officials are involved in the micromanagement of the tax 
collection process.  
Intuitively, it seems very clear to us that redistributive politics and inattention 
cause important electoral effects throughout the globe. For example, the effort 
an incumbent needs in order to mount an election campaign almost certainly 
influences its incentives to start an avoidable or postponable war right before 
an election. Similarly, in many countries pork-barrel transfers are routinely 
announced before elections.  
Identifying how redistributive politics and inattention cycles manifest in each 
country must be done on a case-by-case basis. In doing so it should be 
recognized that these forces may also be driving familiar cycles in macro 
variables such as cycles in government deficits and unemployment. Traditional 
explanations of these phenomena are hard put to explain cycles in phenomena 
like wildfires and tax evasion whereas our explanations might also be relevant 
in explaining traditional cycles like those in deficits and unemployment. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using several data sets we collected especially for this study, we have reported 
striking increases of Greek wildfires and tax evasion around elections and 
complemented it with evidence that these increases are caused by government 
decisions on matters such as the intensity with which transactions are audited. 
There is evidence that the costs of these effects is large (around 8% of GDP 
throughout our sample), that the intensity of the wildfire increase may be larger 
in prefectures with more intense political competition and that wildfires may 
benefit incumbents once we control for endogeneity, despite apparent citizen 
outrage in response to large forest fires. Preliminary evidence based on limited 
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data suggests that these effects may occur internationally and may be stronger 
in more corrupt countries. 
We discuss institutional details relevant to these observations and interpret this 
evidence on the basis of an explicit model for the incumbent’s objective 
function which we believe captures relevant incumbent incentives. These 
incentives can cause the observed cycles through two channels. First, the 
incumbent must divide attention between campaigning and governing. 
Campaigning increases immediately in response to increases in attention, while 
the quality of governance decreases only slowly through depreciation when left 
unattended, so there is an incentive to govern less effectively around elections.  
Second, some kinds of misgovernance provide immediate benefits to special 
interest groups which can exploit temporarily lax enforcement of laws and 
furthermore this misgovernance is only observed with a lag by voters at large. 
Therefore around elections incumbents have an incentive to leave unattended 
those matters that benefit targeted special interest groups.  
We conclude that tax evasion is caused by looser auditing of transactions for 
businesses which may or may not be specifically targeted as special interest 
groups (e.g. reduction of audits on the self employed may be preferred over 
reduction of audits on listed companies). Wildfire spikes on election years are 
caused by looser procedures for granting of building permits which raise 
incentives to burn forested land and possibly less competent fire prevention and 
firefighting. The evidence for a stronger effect where there is more electoral 
competition suggests some targeting of special interests since attention towards 
wildfire policy is administered at the national level.  Targeting special interest 
groups seems worthwhile since in section 3.3 we found evidence that 
incumbents benefit electorally from more wildfires. That does not mean that 
governments directly benefit from more wildfires, rather our interpretation is 
that - for the magnitude of wildfires typically observed - governments benefit 
indirectly because wildfires generate the opportunity for facilitation of special 
interests via looser granting of building permits. Importantly, governments 
need not even be aware of the fact that wildfires and elections are somehow 
related. 
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Beyond the international evidence we provide, this work is broadly relevant 
because it suggests there are intuitive mechanisms through which clandestine 
but clearly harmful policies may be intensified around elections. Indeed, these 
mechanisms may be an additional cause of some of the regularities traditionally 
studied in the political business cycle literature. It therefore seems desirable to 
suggest institutions that would mitigate these effects. More extensive high 
frequency monitoring of government performance is key to eliminating 
incentives for inefficient redistributive transfers to special interests. Stronger 
post-term accountability and reforming the open-list election system could have 
a similar effect. In line with Romer’s (2010) proposal for fighting corruption in 
Greece, our work suggests that an additional reason countries should ensure the 
civil service is organized independently of elected officials is to reduce the 
impact of their temporary inattention around elections. 
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Table 1. 
 
  32 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
  Sep-08 Sep-09 
Direct taxation 1.912 2.049 
Income 1.666 1.629 
Wealth 62 65 
Arrears & other 184 355 
   
Indirect taxation 2.078 1.889 
VAT & other transaction taxes 1.331 1.154 
Special consumption taxes (fuel, 
tobacco etc) 682 677 
Arrears & other 65 58 
  
   
Notes: All numbers in million Euros. Year-on-year reductions occur in tax 
subcategories in which there is considerable room for time-varying tax 
evasion. This leads to a reduction of VAT revenues as the intensity of 
audits is relaxed, while income tax revenues are not affected as income 
taxes are usually annual and not monitored through day-to-day audits that 
can easily be manipulated. On the other hand, incumbents often settle 
payments of income tax arrears at a steep discount before elections to 
gratify special interests, which is why we observe an increase in this 
category around elections. 
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Table 3. 
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Table 4. 
  Revenue Area burnt 
Regression measures of 
cost per election year 
0.18% of annual GDP (in 2 
months) 
134% of average area burnt on non-
election 
€5.7 bn €14.5 bn 
2.34% of 2008 GDP 5.9% of 2008 GDP 
783,600 ha 
Derived cost cumulated 
over sample (various 
measures) 
  (6% of total surface area of Greece) 
1973-2009 1955-2009 Sample (432 months) (55 years) 
# elections in sample 13 17 
 
Notes: Election effects are based on election dummy coefficients in benchmark regressions. The 
tax reduction effect is calculated as 0.009*2=0.18% of annual GDP since the monthly effect is 
0.009 which occurs on 2 months for each election and over 13 years this is 2.34% of GDP. 
Similarly, the area percentage increase is calculated as exp(0.82) and we can use this together with 
the average area burnt on a non-election year to obtain the burnt area attributed to elections. The 
monetary cost of wildfires is based on an estimate of the cost of 2007 wildfires (see footnote 3) 
which is assumed constant per burnt hectare across time. All calculations use the (currently) 
official 2008 GDP which is €245bn. Cost calculations do not attempt to account for issues of 
fairness, loss of human life and environmental consequences beyond property damages. Note that 
election effects measure only the portion of tax evasion / burnt area that is attributed to an election 
not the full cost of tax evasion or wildfires on election years. 
 
Table 5. 
Forest wildfires across regions  in Greece and local election closeness 
 
Normalized increase 
 in area burnt averaged  
across election years 
Constant 0.348** 
 (0.037) 
% of seats obtained by first party relative to total of top two parties -0.154** 
 (0.056) 
# obs 51 
 
0,14 
 
0,12 
F 7,65 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are measured in 51 prefectures and control for factors that affect 
all areas in a particular year and factors that affect an area on all years. They are based on the 
percentage increase in forest area burnt relative to the average for each area across years (thus 
removing the factors affecting each region systematically). This is then demeaned across years to 
remove annual effects affecting all regions (and then averaged across all election years to remove 
noise). ** denotes  significance at the 1% level and * denotes significance at the 5% level. All 
estimates are based on OLS regressions. Our sample is 2000-2009 which contains four election 
years. 
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Table 6. 
 
 number year on year change in tax/GDP   
Country election non-election election 
month 
non-
election 
month 
p value CPI 
Romania 4 80 -0,023 0,001 0,004 3,8 
Malta 2 22 -0,034 0,003 0,233 5,2 
Norway 4 68 -0,025 0,001 0,260 8,6 
Iceland 4 56 -0,014 0,001 0,272 8,7 
Georgia 2 22 -0,010 0,001 0,279 4,1 
Indonesia 2 58 -0,005 0,000 0,366 2,8 
Jordan 2 22 -0,007 0,001 0,383 5 
Greece 6 90 -0,002 0,000 0,394 3,8 
Nicaragua 2 76 0,002 0,007 0,396 n/a 
Croatia 1 47 -0,004 0,000 0,421 4,1 
Lithuania 2 46 -0,002 0,000 0,439 4,9 
Russia 2 10 -0,004 0,001 0,467 2,2 
Mongolia 4 80 0,018 -0,001 0,740 2,7 
Bahamas 2 40 0,009 -0,011 0,779 n/a 
 
Notes: Countries sorted by p Values. Election months are months before and on an election (so are 
twice the number of elections in our sample). The p-Value in column 6 is calculated for a t-test of 
the Null of equality of mean monthly changes on and off election months versus the alternative 
that the election months have a lower mean. CPI refers to Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index for 2009. Pooling across countries and conducting a t-test for an effect gives a p 
value of 0.16. Pooling and regressing the difference between the election and non-election means 
on CPI we get a p-value of 0.08. 
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Table 7. 
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Figure 1. Drop of revenues in election periods 
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Notes: Bimonthly tax revenues (as % of annual GDP) in the pre-election period of year (N) 
vs. the two adjacent years (N-2, N-1, N+1, N+2). We use bi-monthly revenues because the 
pre-election period includes the prior as well as the poll month. Data is not seasonally 
adjusted and provisional for 2010, while data for 2011 are not available at the time of writing. 
Note that in some cases the adjacent revenues correspond to election periods (e.g. in 2007 and 
1990 elections in which case the effect is somewhat mitigated as we would expect). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Peak of fires on election years 
 
 
Notes: Forest fires in Greece 1955-2009 in log (base 10) hectares with election years are 
marked with a star. Years with wildfire peaks that are not elections (1965, 1988 and 1998) are 
discussed in the text. 
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Figure 3. Quality of governance path under various types  
of optimizing incumbents 
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Notes: The quality of governance is measured in successive elections for various types of 
incumbents (different θ). We set T=48 months for the typical four-year interval between 
elections and assume that quality is observed with one month lag. We assign the discount 
factor µ=0.9765 implying that 
1 2 0 .7 5µ =
 , i.e. roughly one fourth of the electorate’s 
memory fades away after a year, and δ=0.912 so that 12 0.33δ =  implying that governance 
deteriorates by two thirds in the same period if no attention is paid. Finally we set α=1, 
σ=0.20 while γ is conveniently set at 0.88 to give a bliss level of 10. Inherited quality is 
assumed q(0)=3, so that cycles are generated from the first term. 
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Figure 4. Year-on-year changes in monthly tax/gdp 
 
Notes: Only one election in 1990 is clearly above the mean change (straight line) which is just 
above zero. Most likely this attenuated effect is due to the fact that there were three elections 
in a space of less than two years in 1989-1990. Mean off-election is 0.002, mean on election 
is -0.007. 
 
 
Figure 5. Annual tax/GDP 
 
 
Notes: There is no election effect in annual tax revenue data. The declining trend after 2000 is 
associated with the effect of Eurozone entry. 
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Figure 6. Election effect on audits on transaction 
 
Notes: There is a drop preceding the election dates for the total number of tax audits on 
transactions conducted by authorities. This is the tax category for which we also observe a 
drop in revenue. 
 
 
Figure 7. Political competition effect on wildfires. 
 
Notes: We remove wildfire conditions specific to each prefecture (individual effects) by 
measuring wildfire as a proportion of their time series average. We also remove conditions 
specific to annual conditions (time effects) by subtracting from each prefecture's measure the 
average change across all prefectures in each year. We then plot the average wildfire measure 
for each prefecture against the average absolute difference in seats obtained by the two main 
parties (both averages are across the four election years). We plot the OLS line both including 
and excluding the prefectures where there is only one seat. See Table 5 for regression 
analysis. 
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